Mr. President, the Senator

from Connecticut is right that article

1 of the Constitution does not provide

for this, but article 1 of the Constitution

also does not provide for a

declaration of war before the President

is asked to go to war. So this is a very

different circumstance. The President

has not asked us to go to war. He has

said he wants the power to be able to

go to war. It seems completely consistent

with that request that we say:

Yes, Mr. President, you have that

power to go to war; you can do that

within 1 year. If, in fact, you go to war

in 1 year, you can extend that 1 year.

Let me put it this way. If we are 2

years down the road still fooling

around with Iraq, then my friends from

Connecticut and other places have been

so dead wrong about what we are supposed

to do that it would be amazing.

I point out that this is nothing like

Bosnia and nothing like the Balkans.

In that case, we were in the Balkans.

There were forces there, and there were

people on the floor who were attempting

to put a time on how long they

could stay after we had gone in, after

we had already prevailed, after we were

in place.

The third point I make in the 2 minutes

I have is, we learned from Vietnam

the power of the purse is useless.

The power of the purse is useless because

it presents us with a Hobson’s

choice. We have our fighting men and

women in place and we are told, by the

way, the President will not take them

home so let’s cut off the support for

them so they have no guns, no bullets,

no ability to fight a war. And no one is

willing to do that. This is a prudent

way to do this, totally consistent with

what the President is asking. I think it

makes absolute eminent sense. I congratulate

the Senator. Even though I

disagree with him on his underlying

notion, I do think he is right on this

point and I support him.

Madam President, this is

one of the confusing aspects of this debate.

I find myself supporting this resolution

but worried that supporting this

resolution will get us into real trouble.

We use Saddam, Hitler, and al-Qaida

all in the same verbiage and language.

Let me make the real distinction, as I

see it, regarding preemption.

If we knew that al-Qaida had particular

weapons, knowing, as we did,

what their stated objective was, and

with the intelligence we had, we would

be fully within our rights—not under

any doctrine of preemption—because of

the existence of a clear, present, and

imminent danger to move against al-

Qaida.

Conversely, with Hitler in the 1930s,

the rationale for moving against Hitler

wasn’t a doctrine of preemption because

we knew he was a bad guy. It was

because his country signed the Treaty

of Versailles. He was violating the

Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of

Versailles did not have an end date on

it. It didn’t say you cannot have forces

for the first 2 or 3 years, or you cannot

do the following things. We were fully

within our rights as a world community

to go after Hitler in 1934, 1935,

1936, or 1937. It was not based on the

doctrine of preemption but a doctrine

of enforcement of the Treaty of

Versailles, and in a very limited time.

What we have here, I argue, as the

rationale for going after Saddam, is

that he signed a cease-fire agreement.

The condition for his continuing in

power was the elimination of his weapons

of mass destruction, and the permission

to have inspectors in to make

sure he had eliminated them. He expelled

those inspectors. So he violated

the cease-fire; ergo, we have authority—

not under a doctrine of preemption.

This will not be a preemptive

strike, if we go with the rest of the

world. It will be an enforcement strike.

I hope we don’t walk out of here with

my voting for this final document and

somebody 6 months from now or 6

years from now will say we have the

right now to establish this new doctrine

of preemption and go wherever we

want anytime.

The part on which I do empathize

with my friend from West Virginia is

this is not a very clearly written piece

of work. That is why I think Senator

LUGAR and myself and others had a

better way of doing this. But it does incorporate

with the President’s words

the notion that we are operating relative

to weapons of mass destruction

and U.S. security interests and enforcement—

not preemption.

I conclude by saying that the President

started his speech explaining the

reason why he wanted his resolution on

Monday. I guess it was Monday. And he

said at the very outset that this is

based upon enforcing what was committed

to in dealing with weapons of

mass destruction.

I know my time is up. I will speak to

this more later.

I am opposed to the Byrd amendment,

but I hope we don’t establish

some totally new doctrine in our opposition

to it.

Madam President, I rise

to explain why three brilliant lawyers

can be all right at the same time—because

they all started from a different

premise, part of the confusion for the

debate that listeners will find on the

floor.

I join my friend from Arizona and my

friend from Virginia in being opposed

to this amendment, but for reasons different

than theirs. Let me try to explain

as briefly as I can.

The point about whether or not there

needs to be an imminent threat to justify

the President taking action is

what is at stake. I am of the school

that suggests the President need not, if

the underlying amendment passes,

have to show there is an imminent

threat. He is enforcing a peace agreement

in effect. He is enforcing, not preempting.

And he is not responding to

imminent threat.

I do not believe there is an imminent

threat in the next day or two or week

or a month. The reason why I oppose

my friend from the State of Michigan

is because I believe there is an inevitable

threat. We are either going to

have to react, if not tomorrow, we will

have to in the next 5 years. If this man

is unfettered, with $2 billion per year

in revenues, on the course he is on, I

guarantee you, we will be responding. I

guarantee you, we will.

Is it imminent now? No. Is al-Qaida

involved now? No. Is all this talk about

the likelihood of cooperation with terrorist

groups a real immediate threat?

No. I don’t believe any of that now. But

I do know we are going to have to address

it. So the question is, do we address

it now or do we wait a year or

two or three.

The reason I oppose the amendment

of my friend from Michigan is because

the basic premise upon which I began is

consistent with where my friend from

Connecticut began, and that is the

threat need not be imminent for us to

take action. That is because we would

be enforcing Security Council resolutions.

That is authority we are about

to delegate to the President.

I can understand why my friend from

Maryland is upset about the way it is

characterized by the Senator from Connecticut.

The bottom line is I believe if, in

fact, we do not get a U.N. resolution,

we are in a position we were in with regard

to Kosovo. My friend from Arizona

and I stood shoulder to shoulder

on Kosovo trying to encourage the previous

President of the United States to

use force against the Serbs in Kosovo.

I will submit for the RECORD at the appropriate

time, after we had gone

through an effort to get the U.N. to

support it. The U.N. would not support

it. And then we went.

The bottom line was, the Senator

from Arizona and I felt strongly we had

to go. We had to move. Were the Serbs

an imminent threat to the United

States of America? No. Was it a threat

to our security interests? Yes. The stabilization

of southeastern Europe. And

so I think part of the thing that confuses

people here—anyone listening to

the debate, myself included, as part of

the debate—is this notion of the place

from which you began.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

Madam President, I yield

myself the remainder of my time.

The reason to go to the U.N. Security

Council does not relate to sovereignty,

it relates to security, and the security

of the United States based upon the notion

the President of the United States

has recognized when he said he thought

it was necessary to go to the U.N. Security

Council.

I think the arguments made against

the first part of the Levin amendment

are specious. Why did the President of

the United States go to the Security

Council? Was he yielding our sovereignty?

No more than our friend from

Michigan is ‘‘yielding our sovereignty.’’

The President went to the U.N. because,

as one White House official said

to me, he had to do so. Why? For our

security interests. If we did not go to

the U.N. Security Council and check

off the blocks, the moment any force

crossed into Iraq, we would find every

U.S. embassy burned down in every

Muslim country in the world. He went

for security reasons.

My only disagreement with my friend

from Michigan is I do not think we

need a two-step process. We should go

to the United Nations, and the President

says we should go to the United

Nations. We should seek the authority

to enforce the inspectors in disarming

weapons of mass destruction. And if he

fails, my friend says come back and get

authorization to proceed anyway. I am

prepared to give him the authorization

now. That is the only disagreement we

have.

I would disagree with those who

argue against my friend from Michigan

saying that by his making this contingent

of going to the United Nations

first, he is in no way yielding to American

sovereignty, any more than the

President has.

In the underlying resolution, it requires

the President, in effect, to go to

the United Nations and exhaust all diplomacy.

Nobody has suggested the President

of the United States has yielded our

sovereignty. No one should suggest the

Senator from Michigan is, either.

Yes, with one caveat. He

has expressed to me his ability to

achieve a tough resolution would be enhanced

by our not making it a two-step

process. But he personally has told me

and my committee he would consider

and the President would consider a

U.N. two-step process if they had to.

The reason for my saying not two steps

now is it strengthens his hand, in my

view, to say to all the members of the

Security Council: I just want you to

know, if you do not give me something

strong, I am already authorized, if you

fail to do that, to use force against this

fellow.

In response, I cannot

honestly say substantially reduce it. I

think it will reduce it some. This resolution,

for example, reduces the possibility

of getting a strong response compared

to what Lugar-Biden would have

done. The truth is it is marginal. Everyone

has to make their own judgment.

I think it would reduce his ability.

I would be hard pressed to say it

was substantial. He has a stronger

hand having the authority granted to

him after he exhausts the U.N. outcome

to say to them: Look, if you do

not give it to me, I now have the authority

to move.

Madam President, if the

President attempts to take this Nation

to war over Kuwaiti prisoners, I hope

to God that is not what you all mean

by this underlying provision. If this

President attempts to take this Nation

to war over return of Kuwaiti property,

if this President attempts to take this

Nation to war based on this authority

for any reason—any reason—other than

weapons of mass destruction, I will be

on this floor every day taking issue

with this President attempting to stop

the war. I cannot fathom anyone suggesting

that Kuwaiti prisoners warrant

us going to war. This is about weapons

of mass destruction, in this Senator’s

view.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I will vote for the

Lieberman-Warner amendment to authorize

the use of military force

against Iraq. And unlike my colleagues

from West Virginia and Maryland, I do

not believe this is a rush to war. I believe

it is a march to peace and security.

I believe that failure to overwhelmingly

support this resolution is likely

to enhance the prospects that war will

occur. And in line with what the distinguished

Senator from New York just

said, I believe passage of this, with

strong support, is very likely to enhance

the prospects that the Secretary

of State will get a strong resolution

out of the Security Council.

I will vote for this because we should

be compelling Iraq to make good on its

obligations to the United Nations. Because

while Iraq’s illegal weapons of

mass destruction program do not—do

not—pose an imminent threat to our

national security, in my view, they

will, if left unfettered. And because a

strong vote in Congress, as I said, increases

the prospect for a tough, new

U.N. resolution on weapons of mass destruction,

it is likely to get weapons

inspectors in, which, in turn, decreases

the prospects of war, in my view.

I am among those who had serious

reservations about and flat out

straight opposition to the first draft

proposed by the White House on September

19. It was much too broad. The

draft raised more questions than it answered.

It was not clear whether the

authorization requested by the President

to use force was limited to Iraq or

applicable to the region as a whole.

It was not clear whether the objective

was to compel Iraq to destroy its

weapons of mass destruction programs,

to liberate Kuwaiti prisoners, or to end

Saddam Hussein’s regime. It was not

clear whether the rationale for action

was to enforce the U.N. Security Council

resolutions that Saddam has flouted

for the last decade or to implement a

new doctrine of preemption. And it was

not clear whether the administration

considered working through the U.N.

and working with allies important or

irrelevant.

The second draft negotiated with

congressional leadership—and I would

say I believe, in part, as a consequence

of the efforts of my good friend, Senator

LUGAR, and me, and roughly 23 or

24 Republicans—got the attention of

the administration. They were simultaneously

negotiating with the Senator

from Indiana and me as well as the

leader in the House. The leader in the

House reached an agreement first. I

thought that was unfortunate because I

believe we could have had a better resolution

had that not occurred.

Nonetheless, the second draft negotiated

addressed some of these questions

but left others unanswered. Along

with many of my colleagues on both

sides of the aisle—notably, Senator

LUGAR—I continued to seek greater

clarity about the focus of the proposed

resolution.

President Bush brought the resolution

into sharper focus this week in his

speech to the Nation. He said:

He also said his objective was to disarm

Iraq, that his rationale to enforce

United Nations resolutions was not

based upon preemption, and that he desired

to lead the world, and if war was

necessary, it would be with allies at

our side.

Mr. President, the resolution now before

the Congress, similarly, is clear

and more focused than previous drafts.

It is not perfect, but it acknowledges

the core concerns that Senator LUGAR,

I, and others raised and that have been

raised by such Senators as HAGEL and

SPECTER and many others. Considered

in the context of the President’s speech

this week, and his address last month

to the United Nations General Assembly,

this resolution, though still imperfect,

deserves our support. Let me explain

why.

First, the objective is more clearly

and carefully stated. The objective is

to compel Iraq to destroy its illegal

weapons of mass destruction and its

programs to develop and produce missiles

and more of those weapons.

Saddam is dangerous. The world

would be a better place without him.

But the reason he poses a growing danger

to the United States and its allies

is that he possesses chemical and biological

weapons and is seeking nuclear

weapons, with the $2 billion a year he

illegally skims from the U.N. oil-for food

program. For four years now, he

has prevented United Nations inspectors

from uncovering those weapons

and verifying Iraq’s disarmament, and

he is in violation of the terms he

agreed to allowing him to stay in

power.

What essentially happened was, he

sued for peace. What essentially happened

was, the U.N. resolutions were a

reflection of what ordinarily, if there

were no U.N., would be in the form of a

peace agreement.

This resolution authorizes the President

to use force to

In my view, and as has been stated by

the President and Secretary of State,

the threat to the United States is

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs.

The relevant U.N. resolutions

are those related to Iraq’s nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons. And

the fact that we use the conjunctive

clause, the word ‘‘and,’’ and not the

word ‘‘or,’’ means that the authorization

we are granting to the President is

tied to defending the national security

of the United States in the context of

enforcing the relevant U.N. resolutions

relating to weapons of mass destruction.

This is not a blank check for the use

of force against Iraq for any reason. It

is an authorization for the use of force,

if necessary, to compel Iraq to disarm,

as it promised after the Gulf War.

Some in the Administration have argued

that our stated objectives should

be the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Regime change is the ultimate goal of

American policy, as embodied in the

sense-of-the-Congress provision of the

Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. Indeed, an

effective effort to disarm Iraq could

well result in regime change. After all,

such an effort would force Saddam to

make a hard choice—either give up his

weapons or give up power—and he has

made the wrong choices many times

before.

In his own words, the President said:

But this resolution does not make

Saddam’s removal its explicit goal. To

have done so, in my view, would run

the risk of alienating other countries

who do not share that goal and whose

support we need to disarm Iraq and

possibly to rebuild it. And it would significantly

weaken our hand at the

United Nations.

Nor does this resolution give the

President the authorization to go to

war over Bahraini prisoners, reparations

owed to Kuwait, foreign MIAs,

the return of Kuwait’s national archives,

or Saddam’s ties to terrorism

and human rights abuses. These are serious

problems. The United Nations

must continue to insist they be resolved,

including maintaining embargoes

and tightening and strengthening

those sanctions against Iraq. But I

doubt seriously the American people

will support going to war to rectify any

of them; nor will our allies.

The Secretary of State, in testimony

before the Committee on Foreign Relations,

made clear that our core objective

is disarmament. I quote:

By the way, even if my reading is incorrect

and he would be able to go to

liberate Bahraini prisoners, does anybody

in this body think the President

of the United States would risk American

forces and, in a very crass sense,

his presidency by going in with American

forces unilaterally to make sure

that Bahraini prisoners were in fact released?

That is fiction.

This week the President stated the

objective clearly and concisely. He

said:

The President is right to focus on

disarming Iraq and not on regime

change.

Second, the rationale is more tightly

focused. It is to enforce the U.N. Security

Council resolutions on weapons of

mass destruction that Saddam has defied

for more than a decade. This is a

man who waged a war of aggression,

lost the war, and sued for peace. The

terms of surrender dictated by the

United Nations require him to declare

and destroy his weapons of mass destruction

programs. He has not done

so.

This resolution sets out in detail

Saddam’s decade of defying the Security

Council resolutions on disarmament.

It states that Iraq ‘‘remains

in material and unacceptable breach of

its international obligations,’’ through

its weapons of mass destruction programs.

It authorizes the President to

enforce all ‘‘relevant U.N. Security

Council resolutions regarding Iraq,’’

with force, if necessary.

As the President said this week:

America is challenging all nations to take

the resolutions of the United Nations Security

Council seriously.

That is what this is about. Yet some

administration supporters have argued

using force against Iraq is justified on

the basis of a new doctrine of preemption,

a doctrine that would represent

the most far-reaching change in our

foreign policy since the end of the cold

war. In fact, the concept of preemption

has long been part of our foreign policy

tool kit. It is a doctrine well established

under international law.

What we are talking about here in

this new policy is a policy of prevention,

striking first at someone who

may some day pose a threat to us, even

if that threat is not imminent today.

This policy merits a serious national

debate, but not adoption by this body,

nor is it contained in this resolution.

The speed and stealth with which an

outlaw state or terrorist could use

weapons of mass destruction and the

catastrophic damage they could inflict

require us to consider new ways of acting,

not reacting. But that is not what

this is about.

It would be dangerous to rush to embrace

as a new principle of American

foreign policy a rule that gives every

nation the right to act preventively.

The former Secretary of State, Secretary

Henry Kissinger, made this

point powerfully in his testimony before

my committee 2 weeks ago. I

quote him:

Dr. Kissinger is right. What message

would declaring a policy of prevention

send to the Indians and Pakistanis, the

Chinese and the Taiwanese, the Israelis

and the Arabs, the Russians and Georgians?

This resolution does not send that

message because it does not endorse

the prevention doctrine. It does not

need to. Because, as the President has

argued, this is about compelling Saddam

Hussein to make good on his requirement

and obligation to disarm.

Third, this resolution makes clear

the President’s determination to build

international support for our Iraq policy.

Our allies throughout the world

and in the region have important contributions

to make in the effort to disarm

Iraq and to rebuild Iraq, if we go

to war. And we depend upon their continued

cooperation in the unfinished

war against terrorism. The United

States has a singular capacity to act

alone, if necessary. We must—and this

resolution does—preserve our right to

do so. But acting alone in Iraq would

cost us significantly more in lost lives,

in dollars spent, and influence dissipated

around the world. Acting alone

must be a last resort, not a defiant retort

to those not yet convinced of our

policy.

This resolution emphasizes the importance

of international support,

manifested through the United Nations

Security Council. It states that:

Similarly, the President, in going to

the United Nations over the strong objection

of half his administration,

made clear his desire to work with others,

not around them. In his speech this

week, he talked about his determination

‘‘to lead the world’’ in confronting

the Iraqi problem. He stated that if we

act militarily, we will act ‘‘with allies

at our side.’’

I am convinced he will follow

through on this commitment.

In short, the combination of this resolution

and the President’s own words

in recent speeches, both publicly and

privately, give me confidence that

most of our core concerns have been

addressed.

I also take confidence from how far

this administration has come on Iraq

over the past year. Many in this Chamber

predicted, and many who oppose

this resolution predicted, that the administration

would use the terrible

events of September 11 as an excuse to

strike back at Iraq. This, despite any

credible evidence that Iraq was involved

in the terrorist attacks on

America.

Both The New York Times and The

Washington Post have reported that in

the days following 9/11, the most senior

Pentagon officials urged the President

to consider setting his sights on Iraq,

not Afghanistan. I can say from personal

conversations, I know that to be

true. As a matter of fact, I gathered

my Foreign Relations Committee staff

not long after 9/11, when talk of going

to Afghanistan was in this Chamber

and at the administration. I suggested,

based on conversations I had with

some, be careful, prepare. We are not

going to Afghanistan. We are going to

Iraq.

I know there was a proposal that was

being promoted to the President that

he should use this as an excuse to go to

Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld is reported to

have argued there would be a big buildup

of forces with not that many good

targets in Afghanistan.

At some point, the United States

would have to deal with Iraq and is this

not the opportunity? he apparently

suggested—not to me; that is as reported.

Many predicted the administration

would ignore the U.N. and the

need to build international support for

its Iraqi policy. That is not surprising

because senior administration officials

said as much.

During the spring and early summer,

literally dozens of articles flatly stated

that the President planned a unilateral

attack against Iraq. As late as August

29 of this year, The New York Times

reported:

Many predicted the administration

would refuse to give the weapons inspectors

one last chance to disarm.

That is not surprising. That prediction

would have been made because administrative

officials consistently disparaged

inspections.

Richard Perle, senior adviser to the

Pentagon, said:

Vice President CHENEY, as late as August

26 of this year, took this line:

I don’t know how many Sunday

shows I did from June through now,

where every interviewer would say:

But, Senator, you are wrong, the President

is going to act alone. And they

read me quote after quote from high officials.

Thank God for Colin Powell. Thank

God for Colin Powell because that was

the other half being argued by the administration

quietly, saying: Mr. President,

do not listen to those voices who

counsel ‘‘no inspectors and do not go

back to the U.N.’’

Many predicted the administration

would not seek authorization from

Congress for the use of force and,

again, that is not surprising. As late as

August 29 of this year, the White House

counsel—the White House counsel—reportedly

told the President that he had

all the authority he needs to wage war

against Iraq—there was a big deal

about leaking a memorandum from the

White House counsel to the world that

Congress need not be involved, Mr.

President. I had two private meetings

with the President myself, where I

made clear that I thought that was

dead wrong and he would be—to use the

slang on the east side of my city—‘‘in

a world of hurt’’ if he attempted to do

that.

The President said to me personally

he was going to come to Congress if he

sought authority. What did he do? He

came to Congress. But it is not strange

that my colleagues up here would believe

he would not do that. The White

House press secretary actually reiterated

that conclusion of the White

House counsel at a White House briefing.

Each prediction by those who

thought the President would make, in

my view, the wrong choice, seemed

very well founded because it was based

on the beliefs and statements of very

senior administration officials, including

the Vice President of the United

States.

We all know the lore around here—

that the Vice President of the United

States is the most powerful man in the

administration. Some even suggest it

goes beyond that. But guess what?

Each prediction proved to be wrong, as

some of us, quite frankly, predicted all

along.

My colleague from New York may remember

my getting a little bit of a sarcastic

response in the Democratic Caucus

when I suggested there was no possibility

there would be a war before November;

there was no possibility of an

October surprise; there was no possibility

that he would go and seek power

to go to war, if need be, absent congressional

authorization. There was no possibility

he would fail to go to the U.N.

It is not just because that is the only

thing I believe a rational President

could do, but because he told me—and

I suspect many others—that that is

what he would do.

Mr. President, President Bush did

not lash out precipitously after 9/11. He

did not snub the U.N. or our allies. He

did not dismiss a new inspection regime.

He did not ignore the Congress.

At each pivotal moment, he has chosen

a course of moderation and deliberation.

I believe he will continue to do

so—at least that is my fervent hope. I

wish he would turn down the rhetorical

excess in some cases because I think it

undercuts the decision he ends up making.

But in each case, in my view, he

has made the right rational and calm,

deliberate decision.

As I noted a few moments ago, the

President said this week that the use

of force in Iraq is neither ‘‘imminent

nor inevitable,’’ and that makes sense

because while the threat from Iraq is

real and growing, its imminence and

inevitability in terms of America’s security

have been exaggerated.

For two decades, Saddam Hussein has

relentlessly pursued weapons of mass

destruction. There is a broad agreement

that he retains chemical and biological

weapons, the means to manufacture

those weapons and modified

Scud missiles, and that he is actively

seeking a nuclear capability. It remains

less clear how effective his delivery

vehicles are, whether they be the

al-Hussein missiles, with a 650 kilometer

range, short-range missiles, or

untested and unmanned aerial vehicles

for the dispersion of chemical and biological

weapons.

Shifting weather conditions, the likely

incineration of much of the chemical

or biological agent in a warhead

explosion, and the potential blowback

on Iraqi forces, all complicate the Iraqi

use of these weapons. But we are right

to be concerned that, given time and a

free hand, Saddam would improve this

technology.

Other countries have, or seek, weapons

of mass destruction. Saddam actually

used them against his neighbors,

against his own people. He has a

lengthy track record of aggression—

first, in Iran, then Kuwait. He has brutally

repressed Iraqi civilians—the

Kurds in the North, then the Shias in

the south, and then the Kurds again.

And the combination of Saddam Hussein

and weapons of mass destruction

is dangerous, destabilizing, and deadly.

Ultimately, either those weapons

must be dislodged from Iraq, or Saddam

must be dislodged from power. But

exactly what threat does the combination

of Saddam and weapons of mass

destruction pose to the United States?

How urgent is the problem? Some

argue the danger is threefold: one, Iraq

could use these weapons against us;

two, it could use them to blackmail us;

three, it could become a surreptitious

supplier to terrorist groups.

Others question these scenarios. For

example, Brent Scowcroft, President

George Herbert Walker Bush’s National

Security Adviser, and chairman of

President Bush’s foreign intelligence

advisory board, recently wrote:

Similarly, Scowcroft wrote ‘‘there is

scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist

organizations, and even less to

the September 11 attacks. Indeed,

Saddam’s goals have little in common

with the terrorists who threaten us

. . . and he is unlikely to risk his investment

in weapons of mass destruction,

much less his country, by handing

such weapons to terrorists who would

use them for their own purposes and

leave Baghdad as a return address.’’

Daniel Benjamin, former Director of

Counter-terrorism on the National Security

Council staff, and co-author of

the remarkable new book, ‘‘The Age of

Sacred Terror,’’ wrote recently in The

New York Times the following:

I reiterate here, just as Mark Twain

said, ‘‘The reports of my death are

much exaggerated,’’ the reports of al-

Qaida in Iraq are much exaggerated.

Our own intelligence community, in

testimony before the Foreign Relations,

Armed Services, and Intelligence

Committees—that has been declassified—

concluded that the probability

of Iraq initiating an attack against the

United States with weapons of mass destruction

is ‘‘low’’—l-o-w—low. They

also have concluded that ‘‘Baghdad for

now appears to be drawing a line short

of conducting terrorist attacks . . .

with chemical or biological weapons

against the United States.’’

I believe it is unlikely Saddam Hussein

will use weapons of mass destruction

against us unless he is attacked.

To do so would invite immediate annihilation,

and I am skeptical that he

would become a supplier to terrorist

groups. He would risk being caught in

the act or having those weapons turned

against him by groups who disdain

Saddam as much as they despise us,

and he would be giving away what is to

him the ultimate source and symbol of

his power, the only thing that makes

him unique among the thugs in the region.

Of course, Saddam has miscalculated

before, and we are right to be concerned

about the possibility, however

remote, that he will do it again, but we

are wrong on this floor to exaggerate

and suggest this is the reason and justification

for going against Saddam.

What I do believe is that Saddam’s

primary goal is to dominate his region.

His history, his actions, and his statements

make that clear. Weapons are a

means to that end for him, a terrible

tool of intimidation that he could use

to bully his people and his neighbors.

During the gulf war, the knowledge

that Saddam Hussein had chemical and

biological weapons did not deter us

from expelling his forces from Kuwait.

We gave him clear warning that using

these weapons against our troops

would invite a devastating response.

Let me remind everybody, he did not

use them. But a nuclear weapon could

well change Saddam’s calculus. It

could give Saddam an inflated sense of

his invisibility. It could lead him to

conclude erroneously that he finally

had the great equalizer against American

power and that he could fuel a new

spasm of aggression against his neighbors

or the Kurds in the mistaken belief

that we would be deterred for fear

that, if we put anyone on the ground,

they would be annihilated with his theater

or tactical nuclear weapon.

We cannot let Saddam Hussein get

his hands on nuclear weapons. In particular,

we must deny Iraq the necessary

fissile material, highly enriched

uranium, or weapons grade plutonium

needed for a nuclear weapon.

According to an unclassified letter

released by the Director of Central Intelligence

this week:

Therefore, if Iraq wants a nuclear capability

sooner, it will need to turn to

foreign sources for fissile material

which could shorten the timetable for

an Iraqi nuclear weapon to about a

year. This reality underscores the importance

of U.S. and international efforts

not only to disarm Iraq, but also

to reduce and better secure fissile materials

in the former Soviet Union, the

most logical source of black market

purchases or theft.

Concerning Iraq, our first step should

be the one the President apparently

has chosen: to get the weapons inspectors

back into Iraq. There is disagreement

about the value of weapons inspections.

Skeptics, particularly our

Vice President, contend that inspections

can never guarantee the complete

disarmament of Iraqi weapons, especially

given the prevalence of dual-use

materials and mobile facilities for the

production of chemical and biological

weapons.

Proponents believe that inspectors

heighten the barrier to development

and production of WMD and will buy

time until a regime change in Iraq occurs.

They point to the success of

UNSCOM and IAEA.

For example, the British white paper

on Iraq’s WMD issued last month,

which was quoted by those who wish to

move against Iraq, says:

It has been argued that UNSCOM’s

most notable achievements were the

result of fortuitous defections. In fact,

much of UNSCOM’s success was due to

diligent detective work in Iraq. But

let’s assume that defections and not

detection are the key to success. Isn’t

the best way to encourage defections,

isn’t the best way to get firsthand information

about Iraq’s weapons programs

to have inspectors back on the

ground talking to the key people?

I agree with President Bush that

given a new mandate and the authority

to go any place, any time, with no advance

warning, U.N. inspections can

work. They can succeed in discovering

and destroying much of Saddam’s

chemical and biological arsenals and

his missile program. They can delay

and derail his efforts to acquire nuclear

weapons and, at the very least, they

will give us a clearer picture of what

Saddam has, force him to focus on hiding

his weapons and not building more,

and it will buy us time to build a

strong coalition to act if he refuses to

disarm.

There is no question that with regard

to Iraq, we have a real and growing

problem. But I also believe we have

time to deal with that problem in a

way that isolates Saddam and does not

isolate the United States of America

. . . that makes the use of force the

final option, not the first one . . . that

produces the desired results, not unintended

consequences. That is the

course President Bush has chosen, in

my view.

Now it is incumbent upon the United

Nations and the U.S. Congress to help

him stay the course. The United Nations

Security Council must deliver a

tough new resolution that gives the

weapons inspectors the authority they

need to get the job done. As the President

put it, the inspectors ‘‘must have

access to any site at any time without

preconditions, without delay, and without

exceptions.’’

Mr. President, the resolution should

set clear deadlines for compliance, and

it should make clear the consequences

if Saddam Hussein fails to disarm, including

authorizing willing U.N. members

to use force to compel compliance.

I also agree with the President that a

key component of any inspections regime

must be the U.N.’s ability to

interview those with knowledge of

Iraq’s weapons programs in a climate

free of fear and intimidation, including

being able to take them outside of Iraq.

Offering sanctuary to those who tell

the truth would also deprive Saddam

Hussein of their expertise.

To that end, this week, Senator

SPECTER and I introduced legislation

called ‘‘The Iraqi Scientist Liberation

Act’’ that would admit to our country

up to 500 Iraqi scientists, engineers,

and technicians, and their families who

give reliable information on Saddam’s

programs to us, to the United Nations,

or to the International Atomic Energy

Agency.

It is also critical the Congress send

the right message to the United Nations

Security Council. Its members

must not doubt our determination to

deal with the problems posed by Iraq’s

weapons of mass destruction, including

our willingness to use force, if necessary.

The stronger the vote in favor of this

resolution, the stronger the likelihood,

in my view, that the Security Council

will approve a tough U.N. resolution.

That is because the U.N. will conclude

if we do not act, America will. So we’d

better.

The tougher a U.N. resolution, the

less likely it is that we will have to use

force in Iraq. That is because such a

resolution would finally force Saddam

to face the choice between inspectors

and invaders, between giving up his

weapons and giving up power, and

there is at least a chance that he might

make the right choice.

There is also a chance Saddam will

once again miscalculate, that he will

misjudge our resolve, and in that event

we must be prepared to use force with

others if we can, and alone if we must.

The American people must be prepared.

They must be prepared for the

possible consequences of military action.

They must be prepared for the

cost of rebuilding Iraq as the President

said he is committed to do. They must

be prepared for the tradeoffs that may

be asked of them between competing

priorities. They must be prepared for

all these things and more because no

matter how well conceived, no matter

how well thought out a foreign policy,

it cannot be sustained without the informed

consent of the American people.

If it comes to that, if it comes to

war, I fully expect the President will

come back to the American people and

tell us what is expected of us. As a

matter of fact, when he met with the

congressional leadership and the committee

chairmen about 10 to 15 days

ago—I forget the exact date—we were

all around the Cabinet table and at one

point he turned to me and he said: Mr.

Chairman, what do you think?

And I said: Mr. President, I will be

with you if you make an earnest effort

to go through the United Nations, if

you try to do this with our allies and

friends; if in fact the U.N. does not support

our effort, as in Kosovo, and if you

are willing to be square with the American

people, Mr. President, of what sacrifices

we are going to ask of them,

particularly the need to have a significant

number of American forces in

place in Iraq after Saddam Hussein is

taken down.

In the presence of all my colleagues

at that meeting, he said: I will do that.

He has never broken his word.

He has made two very important

speeches so far—one at the U.N. and

one to the American people—about the

danger of Saddam Hussein, but no one

yet has told the people of Georgia, the

people of Delaware, the people of this

country what we will be asking of them

because it will be profound. It may be

necessary, but it will be profound. As I

said, if it comes to war, the President,

I am confident, will go to the American

people.

In his speech this week, he made a

compelling case that Iraq’s failure to

disarm is our problem as well as the

world’s, but he has not yet made the

case to the American people that the

United States may have to solve this

problem alone or with relatively few

others, nor has he told us of the sacrifices

that such a course of action

could involve.

I am confident he will do so, if and

when it proves necessary, but I also

want to be clear about the issues the

President must address before committing

our Armed Forces to combat in

Iraq, as a moral obligation to level

with our people.

First, the consequences of military

action: Attacking Iraq could and probably

will go smoothly. We have the finest

fighting force in the world. Our defense

budget exceeds that of the next 15

countries combined. According to expert

testimony my committee received

this summer, Iraq’s conventional forces

are significantly weaker than they

were during the Gulf War. As a leading

expert in the Middle East, Mr. Fouad

Ajami told the committee there is a

strong likelihood the Iraqis will welcome

us as liberators.

While it would be reasonable to expect

the best, it would be foolhardy not

to prepare for the worst. There is a

danger in assuming that attacking Iraq

will be, as some suggest, ‘‘a cakewalk.’’

We should all heed the powerful words

of military analyst, Anthony

Cordesman, who testified before the

Foreign Relations Committee in July.

He said to my committee:

There is a danger in attacking Iraq.

There is a danger that attacking Iraq

could precipitate what we are trying to

prevent: Saddam’s use of weapons of

mass destruction against our troops.

My friend from Georgia who is presiding

is a military man. He is a former

marine. He is a tough guy. He is level

headed and straight. He might be interested

that last Sunday, as I came down

to the memorial for firefighters—he

knows I commute every day and I

never come to Washington on Sunday—

but there was a tribute to fallen firefighters

which occurs every year and I

was asked to speak. As I got off the

train, I ran into a four-star—I do not

want to identify him too closely—general

in one of our branches who held a

very high position very recently and

still holds a very high position. I asked

him what he thought about the possibility

of this war, and he said he did

not like it.

He said two things to me, and I say

this to the Presiding Officer, an ex-marine.

He said there are two things that

will be fundamentally different from

ever before: We have never gone to war

in an environment that could possibly

be totally contaminated before we get

there; and, number two, we have never

gone house to house in a city of 4 million

people.

This all may work perfectly well.

This all may go just so nicely. But to

imply to the American people that is a

surety would be immoral, disingenuous,

and would reap a whirlwind if it

does not occur.

The American people are tough. They

will do what they think is necessary

for our security and they will make

sacrifices. But I will have no part if we

go to war providing pablum to them

that somehow this is going to likely be

an overwhelmingly easy undertaking.

If we notice, everybody says the

American people support this war.

That is not true. They support this war

if it is a 100-day war like the last war

was. They do not support the President’s

ability to go to war unilaterally.

If we look at all the polling data, what

they support is if we go with our allies

in response to a genuine threat, which

I think exists, and if it is not going to

be costly in terms of the loss of human

life, American soldiers, then they overwhelmingly

support it. Over half still

support it even if there is some loss of

life, but hardly anyone supports it if it

is alone or if there is a significant loss

of life.

As CIA Director George Tenet stated

in a letter to Senator GRAHAM this

week:

There is a danger that Saddam would

seek to spark a wider war. I just did

one of the shows we all do with Charlie

Rose. He quoted to me what I knew privately

from my discussions with him:

the former commander of CENTCOM

testifying that he saw no need to go

into Iraq now, and the cost would be

high.

There is a danger that Saddam would

seek to spark a wider war. Many experts

have expressed concern to my

committee that if attacked Saddam

Hussein would lash out at Israel. Last

month, The New York Times reported

that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

told senior administration officials

that Israel would strike back if Iraq attacks

Israel. Then, key Arab countries

could come under tremendous pressure

to break with us and confront Israel. It

would be wrong for us to tell Israel

what they should or should not do in

their self-defense, but it would also be

wrong to ignore the risk that a war

against Saddam Hussein will ignite a

much larger conflagration.

There is a danger that Saddam’s

downfall could lead to widespread civil

unrest and reprisals. There is only one

thing I disagree with in the President’s

speech on Monday. He said what could

be worse than Saddam Hussein? I can

tell you, a lot.

As I said, there is a danger that

Saddam’s downfall could lead to widespread

civil unrest and reprisal. Chaos

could invite the Kurds to seize valuable

oil fields; the Turks to cross the border

in an effort to prevent a Kurdish state

from arising; and Iran and even Syria

to move in to fill a vacuum.

Not one of these scenarios is inevitable.

None should be used as an excuse

for inaction. But each must figure into

our planning and into the minds of the

American people if we ultimately use

force against Iraq. We must be honest

with the American people.

In his speech this week, the President

made it clear that if military action

is necessary, ‘‘the United States

and our allies will help the Iraqi people

rebuild their economy and create the

institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq

and peace with its neighbors.’’

This is a much more complicated

country than Afghanistan. We are not

done in Afghanistan. We have not kept

our commitment in Afghanistan. We

are taking on a big deal here. I know

the Presiding Officer and my colleague

from Ohio and my colleague from

Vermont know Iraq is an artificially

constructed nation. When has there

been a circumstance in Iraq when there

has been anything remotely approaching

a democratic republic? I cannot

think of it in the history of Iraq as defined

now. The Kurds are Indo-European

Sunnis, the Sunnis are Arab

Sunnis, the Shiites, who make up 60

percent of the population primarily between

the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers,

are Shiites who have been at war with

the Sunnis. The Iranians are Shiite.

There are 700,000 Iraqi Shiites in Iran.

This is complicated stuff. But to listen

to some of my colleagues on the

floor who blow this off like, no problem,

take down Saddam, there is a

James Madison waiting to step into the

vacuum, we will have a democratic republic,

it will set a new tone and tenor,

as the Vice President said, for all of

the Middle East, because we will have a

new democracy there, that is a big

deal. It is a big undertaking.

Why did the President say this? This

is a critical commitment, one I wholeheartedly

endorse, but it is not done

out of altruism, but out of a hardboiled

calculation that in Iraq we cannot

afford to trade a despot for chaos.

None of this will be cost free. It will require

a significant investment of military,

financial, and human resources.

Let’s start with the cost of war. Last

month the White House economic adviser

estimated the cost of the military

campaign in Iraq at between $100 and

$200 billion. My friends in the Senate

are all economic conservatives. Where

are we going to get the money? I say to

my friends, as I said in committee,

those who want to see a national

health insurance policy, forget it for a

while. Those who want to make permanent

the present tax cut, forget it for a

while. As they say in parts of my

State, ‘‘you ain’t got the money.’’

It doesn’t mean we shouldn’t move

on Iraq, but it means we should be honest

with the American people, and tell

them what the estimated cost by this

administration is. By the way, that estimated

cost is similar to what the

Congressional Budget Office suggested.

The higher cost estimates would result

from a lengthy campaign and external

factors such as a spike in oil prices if

that occurs. That is just to win the

war. The cost of securing the peace

could be significantly higher and could

extend years into the future.

On the other hand, maybe we will end

up with an Iraqi Government in place.

There is plenty of money in Iraq. They

can fund their own reconstruction. And

that may happen. I am not being facetious.

But it is not anywhere near certain.

I say ‘‘could’’ because there are those

who believe our commitment to Iraq

the ‘‘day after’’ need not involve exorbitant

expenditures. Former Defense

Secretary Caspar Weinberger told my

committee in August, and Secretary

Rumsfeld repeated it last month, that

the United States would not have to

stay too long in Iraq. They and others

argue that Iraq has a talented population

and considerable resources to

pay for its own reconstruction.

The problem is, one-third of that population

hates the other two-thirds of

the population. They say Iraq will

quickly be able to organize itself politically,

economically, and militarily

into a peaceful, unified nation, free of

weapons of mass destruction.

The American people need to know

that most experts believe Iraq will require

considerable assistance politically,

militarily, and economically. Indeed,

they say we should speak not of

‘‘the day after’’ but of ‘‘the decade

after.’’ My committee heard testimony

in July from a military expert in postconflict

reconstruction. The fellow who

headed up that department in the Pentagon

stated that 75,000 troops would

be required at a cost of $16 billion for

just the first year, to maintain order,

preserve Iraq’s integrity, and secure its

weapons of mass destruction sites. Just

to do that. Just to do that. Other experts

predict the United States will

have to engage substantial resources in

Iraq, which has no history of democracy,

for many more years.

When my cowboy friends say, ‘‘Why

do we need anybody? Let’s go get

them,’’ I don’t want all 75,000 of the

forces being American. Anybody happen

to notice recently that in Kuwait

American military personnel are being

picked off? Anybody happen to notice

that? Anybody happen to notice the

targets in Afghanistan? Where have we

been? The American people need to

know what the experts know. We have

an obligation, the President has an obligation,

to tell them, if the need

arises.

In a recent study in the Atlantic

Monthly, James Fallows summed up

the significant challenges that Iraqis

will not be able to handle on their own.

This is overwhelmingly agreed upon by

left, right, and center. He says they

will not be able on their own to handle

the following: Cleaning up the after-effects

of battle and malicious destruction

Saddam Hussein may create with

chemical and biological weapons or by

sabotaging his own oil fields; providing

basic humanitarian needs in the short

term such as food, water, and medical

care; dealing with refugees and displaced

persons, the 700,000 Shiites in

Iran—I remind Members of the 700,000

in Iran; catching Saddam Hussein if he

tries to flee—we are still looking for

Osama bin Laden. We are still looking

for Omar the tent maker. We are still

looking for these guys. We don’t have

them; Providing police protection and

preventing reprisal killings;

denazification of Baathist officials and

security services; aiding in the formation

of a new government; ensuring

Iraq’s territorial integrity and dealing

with possible Iranian and Turkish

intervention; rebuilding the oil industry

while ensuring a smooth reentry of

Iraqi oil into the world market.

That is a finite list that everyone acknowledges

no new government in Iraq

could do quickly. Those who argue

most vigorously that a post-Saddam

Iraq can be a model and source of inspiration

for democracy in the region and

throughout the Muslim world must be

prepared to back the massive, long

term American commitment. To set

that objective, but then to believe it

can be done on the cheap, is a recipe

for failure.

Let me quote from Mr. Gingrich.

This is a news report in The New York

Times.

The mere fact that these men on the

board are saying we should do this is

evidence it has not been done yet.

We must be clear with the American

people that we are committing to Iraq

for the long haul; not just the day

after, but the decade after.

Finally, let’s consider the possible

tradeoffs here.

The President has argued that confronting

Iraq would not detract from

the unfinished war against terrorism. I

believe he is right. We should be able to

walk and chew gum at the same time.

But if military action comes, it will

take a herculean effort for senior leaders

of our Government to stay focused

on two major undertakings at once.

War is intense. A new front against

Iraq must not distract us from job

number one—taking down al-Qaida.

Let’s also be clear that this could involve

sacrifices. For example, the war

on terrorism is putting intense demands

on Navy Seals, Army Green Berets,

Delta Commandos, Air Force

ground controllers, and Arabic linguists.

Units have been deployed to Afghanistan,

Pakistan, Georgia, Yemen,

Africa, and the Philippines, and last

month the commander of United States

special-operation forces requested an

additional $23 billion over the next 5

years to prosecute the war against al-

Qaida and other terrorist groups. Not—

not—Iraq. Our intelligence services

have also redirected resources to the

war on terrorism.

How are we going to pay for all this?

Can we take on Iraq, prosecute the war

on terrorism, and maintain the President’s

tax cut for the wealthiest Americans?

Can we afford to repeal the estate

tax for the top 2 percent of the

population who pay it? What would be

the prospects for national health insurance

and prescription drug benefits in

the near term?

The point is, we will do what we have

to do to protect our national security,

but let’s not kid ourselves that it can

come down cost free, without tradeoffs,

and without setting priorities.

Setting priorities and making hard

choices is what governing is all about.

So is being forthright with the American

people about what is expected of

them. We should not be afraid to ask

our fellow Americans to sacrifice for a

vital cause if we conclude we should go

to war. Generation after generation of

Americans has done so willingly and

will do it again if that is what they are

called upon to do. But we must be

straight with them.

In conclusion, few resolutions that

come before the Congress are as grave

and consequential as the one before us

today. We have heard powerful arguments

on both sides of the resolution,

and concerning the various amendments

that have been presented. That

is how it should be. We have come a

long way during the last year. The administration

that many thought would

ignore the United Nations, ignore the

Congress, has and is seeking the support

of both.

We have come a long way in 3 weeks,

a long way since the White House first

offered its draft resolution. This resolution

and the President’s words make

it clear that the administration’s objective

is to disarm Iraq and that the

rationale to enforce Iraq’s obligations

to the United Nations is the reason we

would go, and that its determination is

to work with others, not alone. The

President has made it clear that war is

neither imminent nor inevitable.

I am confident that the reason the

President, thankfully, disregarded the

advice of some in the administration—

that he understands the significant

need for others to support us—is that

fighting two wars, a war in Iraq and a

war against terrorism, can be greatly

assisted the more the world is with us.

We do not need them if it comes to

that. But the cost we will pay will be

significantly higher.

I compliment the President for recognizing

that. I am absolutely confident

the President will not take us to

war alone. I am absolutely confident

we will enhance his ability to get the

world to be with us by us voting for

this resolution. I am absolutely confident,

if it comes time and need to go

to war, with others or alone, the President

will keep his commitment to

make the third most important speech

in his life, to come to the American

people and tell them what is expected

of them, what is being asked of them.

To do any less would be to repeat the

sin of Vietnam. And the sin of Vietnam,

no matter what our view on Vietnam

is, is not whether we went or

didn’t go. But the sin, in my view, is

the failure of two Presidents to level

with the American people of what the

costs would be, what the continued involvement

would require, and what was

being asked of them.

We cannot, must not, and, if I have

anything to do with it, we will not do

that again.

I thank the Chair for its consideration

and its patience. I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence

of a quorum.